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Abstract
Many learning problems involve multiple agents optimizing different interactive
functions. In these problems, the standard policy gradient algorithms fail due to
the non-stationarity of the setting and the different interests of each agent. In
fact, algorithms must take into account the complex dynamics of these systems to
guarantee rapid convergence towards a (local) Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we
propose NOHD (Newton Optimization on Helmholtz Decomposition), a Newton-
like algorithm for multi-agent learning problems based on the decomposition of the
dynamics of the system in its irrotational (Potential) and solenoidal (Hamiltonian)
component. This method ensures quadratic convergence in purely irrotational
systems and pure solenoidal systems. Furthermore, we show that NOHD is
attracted to stable fixed points in general multi-agent systems and repelled by strict
saddle ones. Finally, we empirically compare the NOHD’s performance with
that of state-of-the-art algorithms on some bimatrix games and in a continuous
Gridworld environment.
1 Introduction
In recent years, Reinforcement Learning (RL) [49] methods with multiple agents [4] have made
substantial progress in solving decision-making problems such as playing Go [46], robotic control
problems [23], playing card games [3] and autonoumous driving [44]. Furthermore, in other machine
learning fields, powerful algorithms that optimize multiple losses have been recently proposed.
An example are Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [14] which obtain successful results in
Computer Vision [16, 18] and Natural Language Generation [32, 51]. Thanks to their ability to learn
in the space of stochastic policies and their effectiveness in solving high-dimensional, continuous
state and action problems, policy-gradient algorithms [36] are natural candidates to be used in multi-
agent learning problems. Nonetheless, the interaction of multiple policy-gradient agents has proven
unsuccessful in learning a set of policies that converges to a (local) Nash Equilibrium [27, 34, 24].
The presence of more than one agent leads to the failure of standard optimization methods in most
games, due to the non-stationarity of the environment and the lack of cooperation between agents.
The question of how to optimize cooperative and competitive multiple policy-gradient agents is a
problem of theoretical interest and practical importance. Over the past two years, a growing number
of papers has addressed this problem by focusing on continuous (differentiable) games, i.e., games
where agent’s objective functions are twice differentiable with respect to the policy parameters [1, 25].
Some of them only consider the competitive setting due to the success of generative adversarial
networks and the interest in optimizing them [28]. The general case was considered only recently,
where the gradient descent update rule was combined with second-order terms [1, 22, 12, 43]. Some
of them guarantee linear convergence under specific assumptions.
In this paper, we studied how to build a Newton-based algorithm (named NOHD) for learning policies
in multi-agent environments. First of all, we start by analyzing two specific game classes: Potential
Games and Hamiltonian Games (Section 3). In Section 4, we propose a Newton-based update for
these two game classes, for which linear-rate algorithms that guarantee convergence are known,
proving quadratic convergence rates. Then, we extend the algorithm to the general case neither
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Hamiltonian nor Potential. We show that the proposed algorithm respects some desiderata, similar to
those proposed in [1]: the algorithm has to guarantee convergence to (local) Nash Equilibria in (D1)
Potential and (D2) Hamiltonian games; (D3) the algorithm has to be attracted to stable fixed points and
(D4) repelled by unstable fixed points. Finally, in Section 6, we analyze the empirical performance of
NOHD when agents optimize either a linear policy or a Boltzmann policy, in three bimatrix games:
Prisoner’s Dilemma, Matching Pennies, and Rock-Paper-Scissors. In the last experiment, we study
the learning performance of NOHD in a continuous gridworld environment.
2 Related work
The study of convergence in classic convex multiplayer games has been widely studied and ana-
lyzed [41, 10, 47]. Unfortunately, the same algorithms cannot be used with neural networks due to
the non-convexity of the objective functions. Various algorithms have been proposed that successfully
guarantee convergence in specific classes of games: policy prediction in two-player two-action bima-
trix games [52, 48]; WoLF in two-player two-action games [2]; AWESOME in repeated games [5];
Optimistic Mirror Descent in two-player bilinear zero-sum games [9]; Consensus Optimization [28],
Competitive Gradient Descent [43] and [26] in two-player zero-sum games. Furthermore, the dynam-
ics of Stackelberg games was studied by [11] and an algorithm was proposed. Many algorithms were
also proposed specifically for GANs [15, 30, 13].
Some recent works have developed learning algorithms also for general games. The first example is
the Iterated Gradient Ascent Policy Prediction (IGA-PP) algorithm, renamed LookAhead [52]. [22]
discovered that IGA-PP converges to local Nash Equilibria not only in two-player two-action bimatrix
games, but also in general games. Learning with opponent learning awareness (LOLA) [12] is an
attempt to use knowledge of the other agents’ functions to account for the impact of one agent’s policy
on the anticipated parameter update of the other agents. Empirical results show the effectiveness
of LOLA, but no convergence guarantees are provided. Indeed, [22] has shown that LOLA may
converge to non-fixed points and proposed Stable Opponent Shaping [22], an algorithm that maintains
the theoretical convergence guarantees of IGA-PP, also exploiting the opponent dynamics like LOLA.
In [1, 21] the authors studied the game dynamics by decomposing a game into its Potential and
Hamiltonian component using generalized Helmholtz decomposition. The authors propose Symplec-
tic Gradient Adjustment (SGA) an algorithm for general games, which converges locally to stable
fixed points, using the Hamiltonian part to adjust the gradient update. Instead, our algorithm uses the
information about the Potential component and the Hamiltonian component of the game in order to
approximate at every step the general game with one of these parts.
3 Preliminaries
We cast the multiagent learning problem as a Continuous Stochastic Game. We adapt the concept
of Stochastic Game and Continuos (Differentiable) Game from [12, 1, 40]. In this section, after
the introduction of Continuos Stochastic Games, we recall the game decomposition proposed by
Balduzzi et Al. [1]. Then, we describe the desired convergence points. At the end we introduce the
Newton method.
Continuous Stochastic Games A continuous stochastic game [12, 1] G is a tuple G =
(X,U1, . . . , Un, f, C1, . . . , Cn, γ1, . . . , γn) where n is the number of agents; X is the set of states;
Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is the set of actions of agent i and U = U1 × · · · × Un is the joint action set;
f : X × U → ∆(X) is the state transition probability function (where ∆(Ω) denotes the set of
probability measures over a generic set Ω), Ci : X × U → R is the cost function of agent i, and
γi ∈ [0, 1) is its discount factor. 1 The agent’s behavior is described by means of a parametric
twice differentiable policy piθi : X → ∆(Ui), where θi ∈ Θ ⊆ Rd and piθi(·|x) specifies for each
state x a distribution over the action space Ui.2 We denote by θ the vector of length nd obtained by
stacking together the parameters of all the agents: θ = (θT1 , . . . ,θ
T
n )
T . We denote an infinite-horizon
trajectory in game G by τ = {xt,ut}∞t=0 ∈ T. where ut = (u1(t), . . . , un(t)) is the joint action at
time t, xt ∼ f(xt−1,ut−1) (for t > 0), and T is the trajectory space. In stochastic games, all agents
1Given a vector v and a matrix H , in the following we will denote by vT the transpose of v and with ‖v‖
and ‖H‖ the respective L2-norms.
2To ease the notation, we will drop θ (e.g., pii instead of piθi ) when not necessary.
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try to minimize their expected discounted cost separately, which is defined for the i-th agent as:
Ji(θ) =
∫
T
Ci(τ)
n∏
j=1
pij(τ)dτ, (1)
where Ci(τ) =
∑∞
t=0 γ
t
iCi(xt,ut) and pij(τ) =
∏∞
t=0 pij(uj(t)|xt). Note that the function Ji(θ)
depends on the parameters of all the agents. We do not assume the convexity of the functions Ji(θ).
We define the symultaneous gradient [22] as the concatenation of the gradient of each discounted
return function respect to the parameters of each player: ξ(θ) = (∇θ1JT1 , . . . ,∇θnJTn )T .
The Jacobian of the game [22, 39] J is an nd× nd matrix, where n is the number of agents and d the
number of policy parameters for each agent. J is composed by the matrix of the derivatives of the
simultaneous gradient, i.e., for each player i the i-th row of its Hessian Hi:
J = ∇θξ =
á ∇2θ1J1 ∇θ1,θ2J1 · · · ∇θ1,θnJ1∇θ2,θ1J2 ∇2θ2J2 · · · ∇θ2,θnJ2
...
...
. . .
...
∇θn,θ1Jn ∇θn,θ2Jn · · · ∇2θnJn
ë
.
Game dynamics J is a square matrix, not necessarily symmetric. The antisymmetric part of J is
caused by the different cost functions of each agent and can cause cyclical behavior in the game (even
in simple cases as bimatrix zeros-sum games, see Figure 2). On the other hand, the symmetric part
represents the “cooperative” part of the game. In [1], the authors proposed how to decompose J in its
symmetric and antisymmetric component using the Generalized Helmholtz decomposition [50, 1] 3.
Proposition 1. The Hessian of a game decomposes uniquely into two components H = S + A,
where S = 12 (H +H
T ) and A = 12 (H −HT ).
Components S and A represent the irrotational (Potential), S, and the solenoidal (Hamiltonian),
A, part of the game respectively. The irrotational component is its curl-free component and the
solenoidal one is the divergence-free one.
Potential games are a class of games introduced by [29]. A game is a potential game if there exists a
potential function φ : Rn×d → R, such that: φ(θ′i,θ−i)−φ(θ
′′
i ,θ−i) = α(J(θ
′
i,θ−i)−J(θ
′′
i ,θ−i)).
A potential game is an exact potential game if α = 1; exact potential games have A = 0. In these
games, J is symmetrical and it coincides with the Hessian of the potential function. This class of games
is widely studied because in these games gradient descent converges to a Nash Equilibrium [42, 20].
Hamiltonian games, i.e., games with S = 0, were introduced in [1]. A Hamiltonian game is
described by a Hamiltonian function, which specifies the conserved quantity of the game. Formally, a
Hamiltonian system is fully described by a scalar function, H(p,q) : R2×n×d → R. The state of
a Hamiltonian system is represented by the generalized coordinates q momentum and position p,
which are vectors of the same size. The evolution of the system is given by Hamilton’s equations:
dp
dt = −∂H∂q , dqdt = +∂H∂p . The gradient of H corresponds to (S + AT )ξ [1]. In bimatrix games,
Hamiltonian games coincide with zero-sum games, but this is not true in general games [1].
Desired convergence points In classic game theory, the standard solution concept is the Nash
Equilibrium [31]. Since we focus on gradient-based methods and we make no assumptions about the
convexity of the return functions, we consider the concept of local Nash Equilibrium [40].
Definition 1. A point θ∗ is a local Nash equilibrium if, ∀i, there is a neighborhood Bi of θ∗i such
that Ji(θi,θ∗−i) ≤ Ji(θ∗i ,θ∗−i) for any θi ∈ Bi.
Gradient-based methods can reliably find local (not global) optima even in single-agent non-convex
problems [20, 19], but they may fail to find global Nash equilibria in nonconvex games.
Another desirable condition is that the algorithm converges into stable fixed points [1].
Definition 2. A fixed point θ∗ with ξ(θ∗) = 0 is stable if S(θ∗)  0 and S(θ∗) is invertible, unstable
if S(θ∗) ≺ 0 and a strict saddle if S(θ∗) has an eigenvalue with negative real part.
Stable fixed points and local Nash equilibria are both interesting solution concepts, the first ones from
an optimization point of view and the second ones from game-theoretic point of view. It is important
3The Helmholtz decomposition applies to any vector field [50].
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to notice that stable fixed points are a subset of the all local Nash Equilibria of a game (see Lemma 2
in [1]).
Newton method Newton’s method [33] guarantees, under assumptions, a quadratic convergence rate
to the root of a function, which, in optimization, is the derivative of the function to be optimized.
This method is based on a second-order approximation of the twice differentiable function g(θ) that
we are optimizing. Starting from an initial guess θ0, Newton’s method updates the parameters θ by
setting the derivative of the second-order Taylor approximation of g(θ) to 0:
θt+1 = θt −∇2g(θt)−1∇g(θt). (2)
For nonconvex functions, the Hessian∇2g(θ) is not necessarily semidefinite positive and all critical
points are possible solutions for Newton’s method. So Newton’s update in nonconvex functions
may converge to a local minimum, a saddle, or a local maximum. A possible solution to avoid this
shortcoming is to use a modified version of the inverse of the Hessian, called Positive Truncated
inverse (PT-inverse) [33, 35]:
Definition 3 (PT-inverse). Let H ∈ Rn×n be a symmetric matrix, Q ∈ Rn×n a basis of orthogonal
eigenvectors of H , and Λ ∈ Rn×n a diagonal matrix of corresponding eigenvalues. The |Λ|m ∈
Rn×n is the positive definite truncated eigenvalue matrix of Λ with parameter m:
(|Λ|m)ii =
ß|Λii| if |Λii| ≥ m,
m otherwise. (3)
The PT-inverse of H with parameter m is the matrix |H|−1m = Q|Λ|−1m QT .
The PT-inverse flips the sign of negative eigenvalues and truncates small eigenvalues by replacing
them with m. Then the usage of the PT-inverse, instead of the real one, guarantees convergence to a
local minimum even in nonconvex functions. These properties are necessary to obtain a convergent
Newton-like method for nonconvex functions.
4 Newton for Games
In this section, we describe how to apply Newton-based methods to Continuous Stochastic Games.
We start by showing how Newton’s method can be applied to two game classes: Potential games and
Hamiltonian Games. Then we describe an algorithm to extend Newton’s method in general games.
4.1 Newton’s method for Potential games
Potential games (as introduced in Section 3) are a class of games characterized by the existence of
a potential function φ : Rn×d → R which describes the dynamics of the system. In these games,
gradient descent on the simultaneous gradient or the potential function converges to a (local) Nash
Equilibrium as shown in Figure 1. In these games, J = S, and the antisymmetric component A = 0.
Considering the existence of the potential function φ (see Section 3), it is sufficient to apply the
Newton PT-inverse method (see Definition 3) on it to guarantee a quadratic convergence rate to a
local Nash Equilibrium (see Figure 1). Newton’s update for Potential games is:
θt+1 = θt − ηSm(θ)−1ξ(θt), (4)
where η is a learning rate and m the parameter of the PT-inverse (see Definition 3). So, in Potential
games we have the same convergence properties as in single-function optimization. The convergence
into the local minima follows standard Newton’s convergence proofs.
4.2 Newton’s method for Hamiltonian games
Hamiltonian games, as explained in Section 3, are characterized by a Hamiltonian functionH(p,q) :
R2×n×d → R. In these games, the gradient descent does not converge to a stable fixed point but
causes cyclical behavior. Instead, the gradient descent on the Hamiltonian function converges to a
Nash equilibrium. Figure 2 shows the dynamics of gradient descent w.r.t. ξ and∇H on a Hamiltonian
game: the figure points out that a gradient descent on ξ cycles.
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Figure 1: Phase of Potential games: from left
phase dynamic of gradient descent, gradient on
the potential function, and with NOHD.
Figure 2: Phase of Hamiltonian games: from left
phase dynamic of gradient descent, gradient on
the Hamiltonian function, and with NOHD.
Example 4.1. Take a two-player bilinear game with agents with parameters θ1 and θ2 minimizing
respectively f(θ) : Rn×d → R and g(θ) : Rn×d → R respectively. A point in this class of games is
a Nash Equilibrium if ξ(θ) = 0, i.e., ∇θ1f = 0 and ∇θ2g = 0, because ∇2θ1f = 0 and ∇2θ2g = 0.
Considering this, the Nash Equilibrium can be calculated in closed form (if the inverse exists4 ) by
setting the gradient equal to zero:ï∇θ1f∇θ2gò+ ï 0 ∇θ1,θ2f∇θ2,θ1g 0 ò ïθ1θ2ò = 0ï
θ1
θ2
ò
= −
ï
0 ∇θ1,θ2f∇θ2,θ1g 0
ò−1 ï∇θ1f∇θ2gò
The example above provides the intuition that the solution to quadratic Hamiltonian games is achieved
by the following update rule (in Hamiltonian games S = 0):
θk+1 = θk −A(θk)−1ξ(θk). (5)
In the following theorem, we state that even in this class of games the convergence to a local Nash
Equilibrium (using the above update) is quadratic (see Figure 2). The proof is in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 1. Suppose that ξ is Lipschitz, A invertible, bounded and Lipschitz continuos with modulus
M in the region of attraction of the (local) Nash Equilibrium θ∗. Furthermore assume that
∥∥A−1∥∥ ≤
N . Then, there exists  > 0 such that iterations starting from any point in the ball θ0 ∈ B(θ∗, )
with center θ∗ and ray  converge to θ∗. Furthermore, the convergence rate is quadratic.
4.3 Newton’s method for General games
Algorithm 1 NOHD
input: discounted returns J = {J}ni=1, PT in-
verse parameter m
output: update rule
Compute ξ, J, S,A, S−1m
if cos νS ≥ 0 then
if cos νS ≥ cos νA then (4) else (5)
else
if cos νS ≤ cos νA then (4) else (5)
end if
In general games, it is not yet known whether and
how the dynamics of the system can be reduced to
a single function as for Potential and Hamiltonian
games. For this reason, find a Newton-based update
is more challenging: if we apply Newton’s Method
with the PT-transformation of the Hessian we can
alter the Hamiltonian dynamics of the game. Instead,
applying the inverse of the Hessian as in the Hamilto-
nian games can lead to local maxima. In this section,
we show how to build a Newton-based learning rule
that guarantees desiderata similar to those considered
in [1]: the update rule has to be compatible (D1) with
Potential dynamics if the game is a Potential game,
with (D2) Hamiltonian dynamics if the game is a
Hamiltonian game and has to be (D3) attracted by stable fixed points and (D4) repelled by unstable
ones. By compatible we mean that given two vectors u, v then uT v > 0.
The algorithm that we propose (see Algorithm 1) chooses the update to perform between the two
updates in (4) and (5). The choice is based on the angles between the gradient of the Hamiltonian
functionH and the directions of the two candidate updates. In particular, we compute
cos νS =
(S−1m ξ)
T∇H∥∥S−1m ξ∥∥ ‖∇H‖ , cos νA = (A
−1ξ)T∇H
‖A−1ξ‖ ‖∇H‖ .
4If the inverse does not exist and a Nash Equilibrium exists, the system is indeterterminate. Using the
Moore-Penrose inverse we find an approximate Nash Equilibrium (the one with the smallest Euclidean norm).
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When the cosine is positive, the update rule follows a direction that reduces the value of the Hamilto-
nian function (i.e., reduces gradient norm), otherwise the update rule points in an increasing direction
of the Hamiltonian function. Notably, there is a connection between the positive/negative definiteness
of H and the sign of cos νS .
Lemma 1. Given the Jacobian J = S+A and the simultaneous gradient ξ, if S  0 then cos νS ≥ 0;
instead if S ≺ 0 then cos νS < 0.
The idea of NOHD is to use the sign of cos νS to decide whether to move in a direction that reduces
the Hamiltonian function (aiming at converging to a stable fixed point) or not (aiming at getting
away from unstable points). In case cos νS is positive, the algorithm chooses the update rule with the
largest cosine value (i.e, which minimizes the angle with ∇H), otherwise, NOHD tries to point in
the opposite direction by taking the update rule that minimizes the cosine. In the following theorem,
we show that the update performed by NOHD satisfies the desiderata described above (more details
and the full proof are given in Appendix A.1).
Theorem 2. The NOHD update rule satisfies requirements (D1), (D2), (D3), and (D4).
Proof. (Sketch) The requirement (D1) is satisfied if (S−1m ξ)
T∇φ and (A−1ξ)T∇φ are nonnegative
and G is a Potential game; in this case the update rule is S−1m ξ because A = 0. We have that∇φ = ξ
and ξtS−1m ξ ≥ 0 as said before. For requirement (D2) we can make similar considerations: in this
case we have to show that (S−1m ξ)
T∇H and (A−1ξ)T∇H are nonnegative when G is a Hamiltonian
game, that it is equal to say: (A−1ξ)TAT ξ = ‖ξ‖2. Finally, the fulfillment of desiderata (D3) and
(D4) is a consequence of Lemma 1.
Given the results from Theorem 2 and Lemma 1, we can argue that if ξ points at a stable fixed point
then NOHD points also to the stable fixed point otherwise if ξ points away from the fixed point also
NOHD points away from it.
Then we prove that NOHD converges only to fixed points and, under some conditions, it converges
locally to stable fixed points.
Lemma 2. If NOHD converges to a θ∗ then ξ(θ∗) = 0.
Theorem 3. Suppose θ∗ is a stable fixed point, and suppose A,S,H are bounded and Lipschistz
continuous with modulus respectively MA,MS ,MH in the region of attraction of the stable fixed
point ξ(θ∗). Furthermore assume that
∥∥A−1∥∥ ≤ NA and ∥∥S−1∥∥ ≤ NS . Then there exists  > 0
such that the iterations starting from any point θ0 ∈ B(θ∗, ) converge to θ∗.
More details about the theorems and the proofs are given in Appendix A.1.
Remark In this paper, we focus our attention on convergence towards stable fixed points. However,
some Nash Equilibria are not stable fixed points. On the other hand, stable fixed points are an
interesting solution concept since in two-player zero-sum games (e.g., GANs[14]) all local Nash
Equilibria are also stable fixed points [1].
5 Learning via Policy Gradient in Stochastic Games
Usually, agents do not have access to the full gradient or Hessian. In this case, we need to esti-
mate them. We define a T -episodic trajectory as τ = (x0,u0, c10, . . . , c
n
0 , . . . xT ,uT , c
1
T , . . . , c
n
T ).
Following policy gradient derivation [37],∇θiJi can be estimated by:5“∇Mθi Ji = 1M M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
∇ log piθi(xm,t, uim,t)
Ñ
T∑
t′=t
ci
m,t′ − b(xm,t′ )
é
,
where b is a baseline for variance reduction. Then, to estimate the Jacobian J, we have to compute
the second-order gradient ∇θk∇θjJi, with 1 ≤ k ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. If k 6= j we derive [12] the
second-order gradient, exploiting the independence of agents’ policies. This term is in expectation:“∇Mθk,θjJi = 1M M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
(∇ log piθk(xm,t, ukm,t)) Ä∇ log piθj (xm,t, ujm,t)äT Ñ T∑
t′=t
ci
m,t′ − b(xm,t′ )
é
,
5With ∇̂M,θi we intend the estimator of∇θi over M samples.
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where we can derive a baseline as done for the first-order gradient. When k = j we are evaluating
the second-order gradient of piθj . To evaluate this part we derive the second-order gradient as done
for the single-agent case [45], with gi(θk, τ) =
∑T
t=0∇θk log piθk(xt, uit))
∑T
t′=t c
i
t′ .
6:“∇Mθk,θkJi = 1M M∑
m=1
∇θkgi(θk, τm)∇θk log piθk(τm)T +∇2θkgi(θk, τm),
6 Experiments
This section is devoted to the experimental evaluation of NOHD. The proposed algorithm is compared
with Consensus Optimization (CO) [28], Stable Opponent Shaping (SOS) [22], Learning with
Opponent-Learning Awareness (LOLA) [12], Competitive Gradient Descent (CGD) [43] and Iterated
Gradient Ascent Policy Prediction (IGA-PP) [52] and Symplectic Gradient Adjustment (SGA) [1].
6.1 Matrix games
We consider three matrix games: two-agent two-action Matching Pennies (MP), two-agent two-
action Dilemma and two-agent three-action Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) (games’ rewards are reported
in Appendix B). Considering a linear parameterization of the agents’ policies, MP and RPS are
Hamiltonian games, while Dilemma is a Potential game. The Nash equilibria of MP, Dilemma, and
RPS are respectively 0.5, 0, 0.333 regarding the probability of taking action 1. 7
For the first experiment, we used a Boltzmann parametrization for the agents’ policies and exact
computation of gradients and Hessian. In this setting, games lose their Hamiltonian or Potential
property, making the experiment more interesting and the behavior of NOHD not trivial. The
results are shown in Figure 3 (left side). For each game, we perform experiments with learning
rates 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, and in the plots are reported only the best performance for each algorithm. In
Matching Pennies and Dilemma we initialize probabilities to [0.86, 0.14] for the first agent and to
[0.14, 0.86] for the second agent; instead in Rock Paper Scissors to [0.66, 0.24, 0.1]. 8 The figure
shows that each algorithm succeeds to converge to the Nash equilibrium (in MP, CO converges with a
learning rate of 0.1 and takes more than 1000 iterations. The plot is reported in Appendix B.). In
Dilemma, all algorithms except NOHD converge in a similar number of steps, so the lines overlap.
NOHD converges in less than 50 iterations across all games, outperforming other algorithms. In
Table 4 we reported the ratio between the number of steps that each algorithm takes to converge and
the maximum number of steps in which the slowest algorithm converges. For this simulation, we
sampled 50 random initializations of the parameters from a normal distribution with zero mean and
standard deviation 0.5. Table 4 shows that NOHD significantly outperforms other algorithms even
when starting from random initial probabilities.
In the second experiment, the gradients and the Hessian are estimated from samples. The starting
probabilities are the same as in the previous experiment. We performed 20 runs for each setting. In
each iteration, we sampled 300 trajectories of length 1. Figures 3 (right side) show that NOHD also in
this experiment converges to the equilibrium in less than 100 iterations. Instead, the other algorithms
exhibit oscillatory behaviors.
6.2 Continuous gridworld
This experiment aims at evaluating the performance of NOHD in a continuous Gridworld environment.
The agents are initialized in the same position and have to reach the goal in the minimum number of
steps, by playing a Gaussian policy, linear in a set of 2× 2 radial basis functions, which generates the
ν angle for the direction of the step. Each agent has to keep a distance of no less than 0.5 with the
other agent and, if they decide to move to the same region, they cannot perform the action. In Figure 5
we compare the performance of NOHD with CO, IGA-PP, LOLA, SOS, and CGD. The figure
shows the performance at each learning iteration of the algorithms. We note that the performance
of NOHD is comparable to the performance of LOLA, SOS, IGA-PP (IGA-PP and SOS in this
environment show equal performance because the parameter p of SOS is always set to 1). Instead,
CO, CGD and SGA fail to learn good policies, probably due to the potential-like nature of the game.
6All the derivations are reported in Appendix A.2
7Experiments with linear parametrization are reported in Appendix B.
8For readability, we show only a starting point. Appendix B contains the results for different starting points.
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Figure 3: Matching Pennies, Dilemma and Rock Paper Scissors: probabilities of agent 1 to perform first action
with a Boltzmann parametrization of the policies. From left: first two plots with exact gradients; second ones
with estimated gradients. Every algorithm with its best learning rate between 0.1, 0.5, 1.0. c.i. 95. %
MP Dilemma RPS
CGD 0.84 0.99 0.97
NOHD 0.49 0.02 0.38
LOLA 1.00 0.96 0.88
IGA-PP 0.99 0.99 1.00
CO 0.99 1.00 0.81
SOS 0.99 0.99 0.80
SGA 0.99 0.99 0.96
Figure 4: Ratio between the mean convergence steps to Nash
Equilibrium and the maximum mean convergence steps. 50
repetitions are performed for each algorithm sampling the
initial parameters from a normal distributionN (0, 0.52).
0 50 100
−20
0
20
Iterations
J
(θ
)
CGD SOS IGAPP
LOLA CO NOHD SGA
Figure 5: Average return J1+J2
2
for100 learning
steps. 20 runs, 95 % c.i.
7 Conclusions
Although multiagent reinforcement learning has achieved promising results in recent years, few
algorithms take into account the dynamics of the system. In this paper, we have shown how to
apply Newton-based methods in the multiagent setting. The first contribution of the paper is to
propose a method to adapt Newton’s optimization to two simple game classes: Potential games
and Hamiltonian games. Next, we propose a new algorithm NOHD that applies a Newton-based
optimization to general games. The algorithm, such as SGA, SOS, and CGD, considers that agents
can also act against their own interest to achieve a balance as quickly as possible. We also show that
NOHD avoids unstable equilibria and is attracted to stable ones. We then show how the algorithm
outperforms some baselines in matrix games with parametric Boltzmann policies. Furthermore, the
algorithm manages to learn good policies in a continuous gridworld environment. In future work, we
will try to extend the algorithm NOHD to settings where the agent cannot know the other agents’
policies and cost functions. An important extension is to provide a faster convergence rate for NOHD.
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Broader Impact
In this paper, we provide a new algorithm for policy optimization in multi-agent learning. Multi-agent
learning is a research topic with a long history and has recently re-emerged due to advances in
single-agent RL techniques [53]. The potential applications of MARL algorithms are extremely
wide and include the control of practical multi-agent systems, as robot team navigation [6], smart
grid operation [8], control of mobile sensors [7], or drones [38]; or other relevant tasks such as
autonomous driving [44] or robotics [17]. Most recent works are successful empirically, but, on the
other hand, they do not guarantee convergence properties. The convergence of multi-agent algorithms
to undesirable strategies can cause dangerous situations as they can lead to unsafe behavior. Also
during the learning process, the agent can show risky actions. For this reason, is really important to
study algorithms that can guarantee safe convergence properties. In this paper, we propose a new
algorithm that is attracted from stable fixed points, but we cannot guarantee that it will not converge to
saddle ones. Furthermore, our work does not take into account the unsafe behaviors that could occur
during the learning process. Future work should address safe multi-agent reinforcement learning
algorithms.
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A Proofs and derivation
In this appendix, we report the proofs and derivations of the results presented in the main paper.
A.1 Proofs of Section 4
Theorem 1. Suppose that ξ is Lipschitz, A invertible, bounded and Lipschitz continuos with modulus
M in the region of attraction of the (local) Nash Equilibrium θ∗. Furthermore assume that
∥∥A−1∥∥ ≤
N . Then, there exists  > 0 such that iterations starting from any point in the ball θ0 ∈ B(θ∗, )
with center θ∗ and ray  converge to θ∗. Furthermore, the convergence rate is quadratic.
Proof. The proof is the standard proof of convergence for Newton’s methods. We report here the
steps for completeness. The Taylor series expansion of ξ in θ0 is:
ξ(θ)− ξ(θ0)−A(θ − θ0) = O(‖θ − θ0‖)2. (6)
Because A is Lipschitz continuous with modulus M , if we take θ0,θ ∈ B(θ∗, ) then we have that:
‖ξ(θ)− ξ(θ0)−A(θ − θ0)‖ ≤M ‖θ − θ0‖2 . (7)
From assumption we have that: ∥∥A−1∥∥ ≤ N. (8)
Now, we substitute θ with θ∗ in 7 and we use the assumption that ξ(θ∗) = 0:
‖A(θ0 − θ∗)− ξ(θ0)‖ ≤M ‖θ − θ0‖2 . (9)
If we use the update rule and we take θ1 ∈ B(θ∗, ) we have that:
‖θ1 − θ∗‖ =
∥∥θ0 − θ∗ −A−1(θ0)ξ(θ0)∥∥
=
∥∥A(θ0)−1(A(θ0)(θ0 − θ∗)− ξ(θ0))∥∥
≤ ∥∥A(θ0)−1∥∥ ‖(A(θ0)(θ0 − θ∗)− ξ(θ0))‖ , (10)
where in the last step we used the triangular inequality. If we used the inequalities 7 and 8 we have
that:
‖θ1 − θ∗‖ ≤MN ‖θ0 − θ∗‖2 . (11)
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If we suppose that ‖θ0 − θ∗‖ ≤ αMN with α ∈ (0, 1), then:
‖θ1 − θ∗‖ ≤ α ‖θ0 − θ∗‖2 . (12)
Then by induction we obtain that:
‖θk+1 − θ∗‖ ≤ α ‖θk − θ∗‖2 . (13)
Hence limk→∞ ‖θk − θ∗‖ = 0 and therefore the sequence θk converges to θ∗ if we take  ≤ αMN ,
and the order of convergence is at least 2.
Lemma 1. Given the Jacobian J = S+A and the simultaneous gradient ξ, if S  0 then cos νS ≥ 0;
instead if S ≺ 0 then cos νS < 0.
Proof. We know that cos νS =
(S−1m ξ)
T∇H
‖S−1m ξ‖‖∇H‖ ; then the sign of cos νS depends on (S
−1
m ξ)
T∇H.
Suppose that S  0. We show that if S  0 then S−1m (ST +AT )  0:
S−1m (S +A
T ) = S
− 12
m S
− 12
m (S +A
T ) = S
− 12
m (S
− 12
m (S +A
T )S
− 12
m )S
1
2
m.
We use the fact that S−1m is positive definite for construction. So there exists a unique square root
matrix S−1/2m that is symmetric. Then the matrix S−1m (S +A
T ) is similar to S−1/2m (S +AT )S
−1/2
m .
For every vector u ∈ Rn×d:
uTS−1/2m (S +A
T )S−1/2m u = z(S +A
T )z ≥ 0,
where z = uTS−1/2m = S
−1/2
m u because S
−1/2
m is symmetric. Using the same reasoning it is shown
that if S ≺ 0 then S−1m (ST +AT ) ≺ 0.
Theorem 2. The NOHD update rule satisfies requirements (D1), (D2), (D3), and (D4).
Proof. D1 NOHD has to be compatible with Potential game dynamics if the game is a Potential game:
ξTS−1m ∇φ > 0 and ξ(A−1)T∇φ > 0. We notice that∇φ = ξ and that A = 0 because the game is a
Potential game. ξTS−1m ξ > 0 for every ξ 6= 0 since S−1m is positive definite for construction.
D2 NOHDhas to be compatible with Hamiltonian game dynamics if the game is a Hamiltonian game:
ξS−1m ∇H > 0 and ξ(A−1)T∇H > 0. We know that∇H = (ST +AT )ξ and that S = 0 because
the game is a Hamiltonian game. Then ξT (A−1)T (AT )ξ = ‖ξ‖2.
D3 NOHDhas to be attracted to stable fixed points. It means that if S +A is positive definite, and
so, ξT (S + A)ξ ≥ 0. Then S  0. From Lemma 1 we know that also ξTS−1m (S + AT )ξ ≥ 0
so cosνS ≥ 0. The update rule take the max(cosνS , cosνA) that from the previous consideration is
always positive.
D4 NOHDhas to be repelled by unstable fixed points. It means that if S + A is negative definite,
and so, ξT (S + A)ξ ≥ 0. Then S ≺ 0.From Lemma 1 we know that also ξTS−1m (S + AT )ξ ≥ 0
so cosνS < 0. The update rule take the min(cosνS , cosνA) that from the previous consideration is
always strict negative.
Lemma 2. If NOHD converges to a θ∗ then ξ(θ∗) = 0.
Proof. (In the main paper there is a typo and this lemma is called Lemma 1).
Suppose that θ∗ is not a fixed point, so ξ(θ∗) 6= 0. The process is stopped in θ∗ if and only if
S−1m ξ = 0 and A
−1ξ = 0, because if ξTA−1m = 0 and ξ
TS−1m 6= 0 we always take −S−1m ξ as update
since ‖cosνS‖ ≥ ‖cosA‖. ξTS−1m = 0 only if ξ = 0 because S−1m is positive definite by construction,
then we contradict the hypothesis.
We have to mention that with this lemma we prove only that the convergence points of the game are
fixed points, i.e. ξ = 0.
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Theorem 3. Suppose θ∗ is a stable fixed point, and suppose A,S,H are bounded and Lipschistz
continuous with modulus respectively MA,MS ,MH in the region of attraction of the stable fixed
point ξ(θ∗). Furthermore assume that
∥∥A−1∥∥ ≤ NA and ∥∥S−1∥∥ ≤ NS . Then there exists  > 0
such that the iterations starting from any point θ0 ∈ B(θ∗, ) converge to θ∗.
Proof. Since ξ is differentiable by assumption we can write:
ξ(θ)− ξ(θ∗) =
∫ 1
0
[H(θn + t(θ
∗ − θn))](θ∗ − θn)dt.
So we have:
θ1 − θ∗ = θ0 − S(x)−1ξ(θ)− θ∗
= θ0 + S(x)
−1(ξ(θ)− ξ(θ∗))− θ∗
= θ0 − θ∗S(x)−1
∫ 1
0
(H(θ0 + t(θ
∗ − θ0))) (θ∗ − θ0)dt
= S(θ)−1
∫ 1
0
(H(θ0 + t(θ
∗ − θ0))− S(θ0)) (θ∗ − θ0)dt.
Taking the norm and supposing that the current update is with S(θ)−1
‖θ1 − θ∗‖ ≤
∥∥S(θ)−1∥∥∫ 1
0
‖H(θ0 + t(θ∗ − θ0))− S(θ0)‖ ‖θ∗ − θn‖ dt
=
∥∥S(θ)−1∥∥∫ 1
0
‖H(θ0 + t(θ∗ − θ0))−H(θ0) +A(θ0)‖ ‖θ∗ − θ0‖ dt
≤ ∥∥S(θ)−1∥∥Ç∫ 1
0
‖H(θ0 + t(θ∗ − θ0))−H(θ0)‖ ‖θ∗ − θ0‖ dt+
+
∫ 1
0
‖[A(θ0)]‖ ‖θ∗ − θ0‖ dt
å
≤ ∥∥S(θ)−1∥∥ ‖θ∗ − θ0‖Ç∫ 1
0
Lt ‖θ∗ − θ0‖ dt+
∫ 1
0
MAdt
å
≤ NSL ‖θ∗ − θ0‖2 +NAMA ‖θ∗ − θ0‖ ≤ (NSL+NAMA) ‖θ∗ − θ0‖ .
If we suppose that ‖θ∗ − θ0‖ ≤ α(NSL+NAMA) with α ∈ (0, 1), then:
‖θ∗ − θ1‖ ≤ α ‖θ∗ − θ0‖ .
Then by induction:
‖θ∗ − θn‖ ≤ α ‖θ∗ − θn−1‖ .
Hence, limn→∞ ‖θ∗ − θn‖ = 0, so if we take  ≤ αmax (NSL+NAMA,NAL+NSMS) the sequence
converges.
A.2 Derivations of section 5
In this section, we derive the estimators for the first and second derivatives of the discounted
return J . The derivations are inspired by standard policy gradient [36] and by [12]. For all the
derivations we suppose that there exist only two agents i and k. Recall that an episode is τ =
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(x0,u0, c
1
0, . . . , c
n
0 , . . . xt,ut, c
1
t , . . . , c
n
t ). We identify with C
i
t =
∑T
l=t γ
l−tcil .
∇θi Epii,pij ,τ [Ji] = ∇θi Eτ [Ci1(τ)
T∏
l=1
piθi(u
i
l|xl,θi)
T∏
l=1
piθi(u
j
l |xl,θj)]
= Epij ,τ [Ci1(τ)∇θi
T∏
l=1
piθi(u
i
l|xl,θi)]
= Epii,pij ,τ [Ci1(τ)
T∑
l=1
∇θi log piθi(uil|xl,θi)].
In the main paper we report the temporal structure [36] derived by the consideration that:
Eu∼pii [∇θ log piθi(xt, u)
t−1∑
t′=1
cit|τ1:t−1] = (
t−1∑
t′=1
c′t)
∫
piθ(xt, u)∇θ(log piθ(xt, ut)du
= (
t−1∑
t′=1
c′t)
∫
∇θpiθ(xt, u)du = 0.
The baseline is derived as in [36]. So the estimator is:“∇M,θiJi = 1M M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
∇ log piθi(xm,t, uim,t)
Ñ
T∑
t′=t
ci
t′ − b(xt′ )
é
.
We derive as in [12] the second order of the policy gradient∇θk,θiJi:
∇θk,θi Epii,pij ,τ [Ji] = ∇θk∇θi Eτ [Ci1(τ)
T∏
l=0
piθi(u
i
l|xl,θi)
T∏
l=1
piθi(u
j
l |xl,θj)]
= Epij ,τ [Ci1(τ)∇θk
T∏
l=1
piθk(u
i
l|xl,θk)∇θi
T∏
l=1
piθi(u
i
l|xl,θi)]
= Epii,pij ,τ [Ci1(τ)(
T∑
l=1
∇θk log piθk(ukl |xl,θik)(
T∑
l=1
∇θi log piθi(uil|xl,θi))T ].
So the estimator is:“∇M,θk,θjJi = 1M M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
(∇ log piθk(xm,t, ukm,t)) T∑
t=1
Ä
∇ log piθj (xm,t, ujm,t)
äT Ñ T∑
t′=1
ci
t′ − b(xt′ )
é
.
Then we derive the second order policy gradient ∇2θiJi adapting the single agent derivations of
[45] into the multi-agent setting. We indicate as gi(θi, τ) = Ci1
∑T
t=1 log piθi(xt, ut), with pii(τ) =∏T
t=1 piθi(ut|xt) and ∇θiJi =
∫
τ
pii(τ)pik(τ)∇θigi(θi, τ). So:
∇2θiJi =
∫
τ
∇θipii(τ)pik(τ)∇θigi(θi, τ) + pii(τ)pik(τ)∇2θigi(θi, τ)
=
∫
τ
pii(τ)pik(τ)∇θi log pii(τ)∇θigi(θi, τ) + pii(τ)pik(τ)∇2θigi(θi, τ)
=
∫
τ
pii(τ)pik(τ)(∇θi log pii(τ)∇θigi(θi, τ) +∇2θigi(θi, τ))
= E[∇θi log pii(τ)∇θigi(θi, τ) +∇2θigi(θi, τ)].
16
So the estimator is:“∇2M,θkJi = 1M M∑
m=1
(∇θkgi(θk, τ)∇θk logP(θk)(τ)T +∇2θkgi(θk, τ)) .
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Head Tail
Head 1 -1 -1 1
Tail -1 1 1 -1
Table 1: Matching pennies payoffs.
Head Tail
Head -1 -1 -3 0
Tail 0 -3 -2 -2
Table 2: Dilemma payoffs.
Rock Paper Scissors
Rock 0 0 -1 -1 1 -1
Paper 1 -1 0 0 -1 1
Scissors -1 1 1 -1 0 0
Table 3: RPS payoffs.
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Figure 6: Agent 1’s probabily to perform action 1 in Matching Pennies with Consensus. Exact gradients. 20
repetitions. Learning rate 0.1. 95% c.i.
B Experimental results
In this appendix, we report some additional experimental results on the two games Matching Pennies
and Rock–Paper–Scissors. We compare NOHD against 6 baselines (Consensus [28], LOLA [12],
IGAPP [52], SOS [22], CGD [43]), SGA [1]. We settled the hyperparameter a, b of SOS as in the
original paper a = 0.5 and b = 0.1 (even if the experiments in the original paper are on another
game). The parameter m of the PT-inverse is settled to 0.03 in all the experiments. We conduct
experiments with a linear parametrization of the policy and a Boltzmann parametrization of the policy.
In the Boltzmann experiments we show results with exact gradients and estimated gradients. We
estimated the gradients with batch size equals to 300 and horizon 1. Below we report the payoff
matrices of Matching Pennies (Table 1), Rock–Paper–Scissors (Table 3), and Dilemma (Table 2).
In Figure 6 we report the results for Consensus with 2000 iterations and learning rate 0.1 in order to
show that the algorithm converges.
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B.1 Matching pennies linear parametrization
In this section we reported the behavior of NOHD and the other benchmarks in a linear parametrization
of Matching Pennies game. As you can see NOHD, as CGD, converges to the Nash Equilibrium in
only one step. We show the best results searching between learning rates 1.0, 0.5, 0.1, 0.05.
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Figure 7: Agents’ probabily to perform action 1 in Matching Pennies. The initial probabilities are settled to 0.8
and 0.2. From top right to bottom left: CGD, consensus, LOLA, IGAPP, SOS, NOHD, and SGA.
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B.2 Matching pennies with exact gradients
In this section we reported the experiments on Matching Pennies game with 20 different starting
probabilities, sampled from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Figure 8
shows how all the algorithms succeed in converging to the Nash Equilibrium, but NOHD converges
in less than 100 iterations.
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Figure 8: Agent 1’s probabily to perform action 1 in Matching Pennies. From top right to bottom left: CGD,
consensus, LOLA, IGAPP, SOS, NOHD, and SGA. True gradients. 20 random sampled initial probabilities.
Learning rate 0.1, 0.5, 1.0. 95% c.i.
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B.3 Matching pennies with approximated gradients
In this section, we reported the experiments on the Matching Pennies game with 20 different starting
probabilities, sampled from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. In this case
we estimate the gradient and the Hessian using 300 sampled trajectories. Figure 9 shows how all the
algorithms succeed in converging to the Nash Equilibrium, but NOHD converges in less than 100.
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Figure 9: Agent 1’s probabily to perform action 1 in Matching Pennies. From top right to bottom left: CGD,
consensus, LOLA, IGAPP, SOS, NOHD, and SGA. Estimated gradients batch size 300. 20 random sampled
initial probabilities. Learning rate 0.1, 0.5, 1.0. 95% c.i.
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B.4 Rock paper scissors with exact gradients
In this section, we reported the experiments on Matching Pennies game with 20 different starting
probabilities, sampled from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.5. For
every algorithm we perform experiments with learning rates 0.1, 0.5, 1. Figure 10 shows how all the
algorithms succeed in converging to the Nash Equilibrium, but NOHD converges in less than 100
iterations.
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Figure 10: Agent 1’s probabily to perform action 1 in Rock Paper Scissors. From top right to bottom left: CGD,
consensus, LOLA, IGAPP, SOS, NOHD, and SGA. Estimated gradients batch size 300. 20 random sampled
initial probabilities. Learning rate 0.1, 0.5, 1.0. 95% c.i.
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B.5 Rock Paper Scissors with approximated gradients
In this section, we reported the experiments on Rock–Paper–Scissors game with 20 different starting
probabilities, sampled from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.5. In this
case, we estimate the gradient and the Hessian using 300 sampled trajectories. Every algorithms do
not perform well with learning rate 1.0 and for this reason we report results only with learning rates
0.1, 0.5. Figure 11 shows how all the algorithms succeed in converging to the Nash Equilibrium, but
NOHDconverges in less than 100.
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Figure 11: Agent 1’s probabily to perform action 1 in Rock Paper Scissors. From top right to bottom left: CGD,
consensus, LOLA, IGAPP, SOS, NOHD, and SGA. Estimated gradients. 20 random sampled initial probabilities.
Learning rate 0.1, 0.5. 95% c.i.
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B.6 Continuous gridworld
The hyperparameters of the gridworld experiment are:
• Number of samples (Batch size): 1000
• Horizon (trajectories’ lenght): 20
• Discount factor 0.98
• Distance between the two players 0.5
• Goal radius 0.8
• Radial basis functions: 2× 2
• Learning rate 0.1
B.7 Generative Adversarial Network
We show a simple experiment with a mixture of 4 bi-variate Gaussians with means: (1.5,−1, 5),
(1.5, 1, 5), (−1.5, 1.5), (−1.5,−1.5). The generator and discriminator networks are both with two
ReLu layers with 10 neurons per layer. The output of the discriminator has size 1 and the output of
the generator has size 2. The learning rate is 0.01. We report that NOHD finds all the modes in 400
steps and we compare these results with SGA. The results shown below are for random seed 25.
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Figure 12: Generator’s learnt distribution for iterations 0, 100, 200, 300, 400.
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